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Abstract 
The fields of information assurance and digital forensics continue to grow in both importance and complexity, 
spurred on by rapid advancement in digital crime.  Contemporary law enforcement professionals facing such 
issues quickly discover that they cannot be successful while operating in a vacuum and turn to colleagues for 
assistance.  However, there is a clear need for greater IT-based knowledge sharing capabilities amongst law 
enforcement organizations; an environment historically typified by a silo mentality.  A number of efforts have 
attempted to provide such capabilities, only to be met with limited enthusiasm and difficulties in sustaining 
continued use.  Conversely, the hacker community achieves rapid advancement due to its diligent emphasis on 
knowledge sharing through technology.  The characteristics of knowledge sharing willingness and effectiveness 
within these two communities create a distinct advantage for hackers.  In what follows, these two highly 
disparate communities are juxtaposed in terms of what drives their relative effectiveness in knowledge sharing 
efforts.  The resulting conclusions lay a foundation for deeper empirical investigation into this phenomenon, 
which in turn may drive design decisions for emerging law enforcement knowledge sharing platforms such as the 
U.S.National Repository for Digital Forensics Intelligence.  
Keywords 
sharing, digital forensics, transactive memory, normative behavior. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is intuitively recognized that increased sharing of knowledge leads to better outcomes, and research to date 
has shown that knowledge creation and sharing is a key part of an organization’s knowing cycle that positively 
impacts decision-making (Choo 2002).  This paper evaluates the differences in knowledge sharing between the 
disparate communities of hackers and law enforcement. 
Hackers as a group, whether they act for nefarious purposes or to improve security, are most likely to engage in 
hacking for social reasons, including knowledge sharing, teaching others, and attending conferences (Denning, 
1992).  Information sharing within this group has grown well beyond simple website postings: Black Hat and 
DefCon are two of several major conferences that were developed by the hacking community specifically for 
learning, sharing, and discussing their techniques. In fact, because of the level of sharing and the technical talent 
of the presenters, they are now considered premier events where all sides of the security debate can come 
together and communicate. 
In contrast, there are few law enforcement (LE) sites to counter exploits that may be used in an illegal manner. 
Most, such as COPLINK, are used to share specific case information to tie commonalities across jurisdictions in 
order to identify repeat offenders of various crimes but are not focused on sharing and developing new 
techniques for solving those crimes.  Others, like Cybercop, are much more free-form, providing forums for LE 
to collaborate and share knowledge in any way, but that same lack of structure is an impediment to analysts and 
investigators seeking to cull out very specific information relevant to a current case.  Security restrictions on 
these sites also limit the kind of knowledge sharing that will lead to rapid discovery and implementation of 
counter-approaches. If knowledge-sharing is known to be desirable, what limits LE from doing so on a broader 
and more consistent basis?  How could these limiting factors be moderated? 
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While studying the network security community, Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak (2005) found that information security 
personnel preferred to rely on a personal network of friends, or ego-centric groups, for their knowledge-seeking 
activities.  It is proposed that the LE community employ the same behaviors.  Rather than store and share their 
information in a broadly accessible manner on web sites or organizational repositories, LE professionals may, 
like network security specialists, simply prefer other knowledge-sharing approaches.  
There have been some attempts by the LE community to share information, and a few researchers have 
attempted to build knowledge-sharing systems in support of cyber investigations.  However, successful LE 
knowledge-sharing vehicles seem to be few and far between.  This paper conceptualizes the knowledge-sharing 
behaviors of the hacker and LE communities.  The communities are first scoped and their characteristics 
compared.  Preliminary evidence is also offered to suggest why the hacker community out-shares the LE 
community to such a great extent.  Finally, a research model is offered to help frame future research efforts. 
SCOPING THE COMMUNITY 
The word ‘hacker’ has evolved over the years from referring to individuals who are knowledgeable about 
computers to “…persons who deliberately gain (or attempt to gain) unauthorized access to computers.” (Furnell 
and Warren, 1999, p 29).  However, many suggest that hacking can go beyond simple access and be 
accomplished for unauthorized use, the perpetration of other crimes (i.e. child pornography), and the 
development of tools for carrying out those acts (Whitman and Mattord, 2005, Conklin et al, 2004, Denning, 
1999).  For the purpose of this study, “hacker” is defined as someone who gains (or attempts to gain) 
unauthorized access or use of information technology either to its own end or in support of perpetrating other 
crimes.  This includes those who wish to breach information security mechanisms as well as those who have 
authorized access but seek to use the information technology in an unauthorized manner.  For example, an 
employee who has authorized access to a company computer may hide contraband material in the slack space on 
the hard drive.  The employee may not have used hacking techniques to breach the company’s information 
security defenses, but they used their knowledge to commit another offense. 
On the other side of the coin is law enforcement (LE).  The term can mean anything from the uniformed patrol 
officer to a criminal investigator to a district attorney.  For the purposes of this research, the  definition of law 
enforcement is limited to those who are assigned or dedicated to the investigation of computer (cyber) crimes 
and those crimes in which information technologies were used to perpetrate the act.  This group (hereafter 
referred to as LE or the LE community) includes criminal investigators, digital forensic specialists, prosecutors, 
and other law enforcement officials whose duty it is to support the investigation of computer-related crimes. 
These two groups are frequently at odds.  Hackers may perpetrate crimes and the LE community enforces the 
law and investigates crimes.  Both groups require some computer knowledge and both can better achieve their 
objectives by sharing knowledge with others in their communities.  Yet, the hackers seem to do a better job of 
disseminating information to others in their community.  The following section offers a comparison of the two 
communities. 
 
COMPARISON OF THE GROUPS 
Hackers and LE personnel have differing motivations for what they do.  Hackers seek to gain access and use 
information systems for a number of reasons.  Denning (1999) suggests that they do it for thrills, status, control, 
power and intellectual discovery.  She describes hacking as a “…social and educational*” activity (p. 47).  
However, like others, she notes that hacking has evolved to include more nefarious acts in recent years.   
As a group, hackers enjoy traits that LE does not.  For example, hackers can use pseudonyms or “handles” to 
identify themselves in their social communities.  This enables them to benefit from personal anonymity and yet 
reap the rewards of recognition for their “handle”. Table 1 compares the differences in group traits, based on the 
prior research mentioned. 
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Hackers Law Enforcement (LE) 
Anonymity No Anonymity 
Recognition (Hacker Handle) No Recognition 
Intrinsic Task-Load Additional Task-Load 
Virtual environment No Virtual environment 
Ego-centric groups Ego-centric groups 
Limited high stakes High Stakes 
Unclassified info Some classified info 
Table 1:   Group Differences between Hackers and LE 
 
Anonymity:  Hackers share information through websites and communities of practice on the Internet.  As 
noted, in order to maintain anonymity they use “handles.” (Denning, 1999, p. 44).  While anonymity provides 
them with a certain level of protection from legal prosecution, it also gives them more opportunities for 
information sharing.  Anonymity has been shown to be critical in group information sharing and decision 
making (Roa and Jarvenpaa, 1991).  It also provides for a domain of deindividuation where social cues are 
removed and individuals can behave in a manner outside of social norms (Zimbardo, 1969).  Further, studies in 
group work have hypothesized anonymity to be a factor in eliciting group member ideas (George, et al., 1990; 
Nunamaker, et. al., 1991), and they proposed that “…anonymous communications will be more effective in 
groups where members are reticent…” (Roa and Jarvenpaa, 1991, p 12). 
Recognition:  Another factor proven to be a motivator for information and knowledge-sharing is recognition 
(Butler, et. al, 2004; Chan et. al., 2004; Thomas-Hunt et. al., 2003; Wasko and Teigland, 2002).  Building on the 
Theory of Information Sharing (Constant, et. al., 1994), Chan and colleagues found that members of an on-line 
group often felt obligated to share knowledge and information when they were recognized as experts in a given 
knowledge domain (2004).  Similarly, Jarvenpaa and Staples (2000) found that recognition and self-efficacy 
result in a culture of sharing.  In the hacker communities, the handles become a pseudo-identity which the 
individual can use to enjoy the benefits of both anonymity and recognition.   
Recognition within the hacker community is derived from a cultural norm to praise the discovery of a hack to a 
greater degree than the exploitation of a known hack.  In other words, the community rewards the discovery of a 
vulnerability with increased reputation and social standing more so than it does the taking advantage of such a 
vulnerability after it has been discovered.  By way of contrast, recognition in the LE community is frequently 
accrued to the department or organization rather than an individual. 
Task-Load:  Understandably, the action of adding information to a knowledge-sharing mechanism such as a 
webpage, community of practice or shared repository is, to many, simply an additional task in their work day.  
Disterer (2003, p. 221) notes that while culture is the biggest impediment to knowledge-sharing, it is also 
“…often seen as additional work.”   Further, Gil-Garcia and colleagues (2007) note that individual perceptions 
about expected benefits may play a role.  Thus, potential knowledge contributors may need some intrinsic or 
extrinsic motivation to share. 
Virtual environment:    Interactions within the virtual world of the internet affords hackers both a sense of 
community that aids knowledge-sharing and the empowerment of anonymity with regard to rule-breaking 
behavior.  Hackers have a strong knowledge-sharing ethic as evidenced by attempts to socially codify the 
community’s  purpose with a declaration of independence of Cyberspace (Barlow 1996) and a central “rule” that 
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enforces the social validity – even necessity – of sharing information and “freeing” information where it is not 
publicly available (Guadamuz 2002).  Hackers appear to treat information as a public good; in the same manner, 
information sharing on the internet can be likened to a gift philosophy (Bays and Mowbray 1999) wherein a 
small content/knowledge donation made by each individual is matched many times over by the aggregate of all 
the contributions from all the users. 
In these environments where knowledge is seen as a public good, such as in a Knowledge Management System 
(KMS), a variety of antecedents to knowledge-sharing have been studied (Marks, Polak et al. 2008).  Of these 
antecedents, group identification has been shown to be a strong motivator for individuals to provide resources to 
a common good and can induce pro-self individuals to adopt pro-social behaviors (De Cremer and Van Vugt 
1999).  In the hacker context, pro-social behavior relates to helping the hacker community, not society at large. 
LE officials also have a strong sense of community that should similarly create group identification and enhance 
knowledge-sharing. One could surmise that the moderating effect of group identification on an individual 
hacker’s propensity to share removes whatever edge LE might have enjoyed due simply to their community, 
however, that has not been fully studied. 
Hackers also enjoy a form of anonymity that allows them to simultaneously separate their virtual world 
identifier (handle or avatar) from their acts, yet also accrue peer recognition and social capital through the 
persistence of their virtual world identifier through time.  Anonymity alone can also act as a driver for hacking; 
absent other normative factors, individuals who operate under the condition of anonymity (non-identifiability 
and non-accountability) are more likely to engage in rule-breaking behavior (Nogami and Takai 2008).   
Ego-Centric Groups:    Knowledge-sharing is a natural phenomenon.  However, the way knowledge is shared 
and with whom it is shared may vary from group to group.  In their study of network security professionals, 
Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak (2005) found that individuals work in ego-centric groups.  That is, they work with 
others whom they perceive are like them.  In the network security field, it is common for one specialist to call on 
a friend for knowledge or information when it is needed.  Rather than learn a network security procedure 
themselves, they rely on their friend or colleague to know what to do.  This is what Wegner (1987) describes as 
Transactive Memory System (TMS) Theory.  The users of the information know the knowledge they seek is 
stored in the minds of the members of their ego-centric network.   
Stakes:   It is reasonable to assume that the stakes for knowledge-sharing, in terms of risks and rewards, can 
vary from community to community.  This is indeed the case when comparing law enforcement and hacker 
communities.  Of particular interest in this comparison is the manner in which risks and rewards uniquely 
interact within each of these communities.  On this topic, the literature groups rewards and risks into the 
categories of intrinsic and extrinsic.  Intrinsic motivators are explored in depth through the lens of Social 
Exchange Theory (e.g. Blau 1967) and involve factors such as personal obligation, gratitude, and trust (Bock 
and Kim 2002).  Extrinsic motivators, such as those examined through Economic Exchange Theory, involve 
factors such as monetary rewards and promotion.  From this perspective, knowledge-sharing will take place 
when the benefits or rewards for doing so outweigh the costs or risks (Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Constant, 
Kiesler et al. 1994). 
The structures and norms of these two communities are unique in that they create a critical interplay between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivators.  In the case of the hacker community, this interplay appears to have an 
amplifying effect with respect to knowledge-sharing, where consistently increased knowledge-sharing provides 
greater rewards while concomitantly reducing the extent of risk to which the hacker is exposed (as shown in 
Figure 1).   
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Figure 1: Risk/reward interplay in the hacker 
community 
 
The benefits for knowledge-sharing in the hacker community are primarily intrinsic in nature and reward 
participants through improved reputation, recognition, and social standing within the community.  However, the 
drawbacks for knowledge-sharing in this community are decidedly extrinsic in nature, stemming from the legal 
implications of using such knowledge to perform illegal acts.  Through the structure of risks and rewards within 
the hacker community, and the emergent norms from the community itself, participants are driven to discover 
novel opportunities for exploitation rather than take advantage of such opportunities.  Therefore, the most 
effective efforts to increase rewards will also mitigate the extent of the risk undertaken for doing so.  It is worth 
noting as well that, while real intrinsic risks exist within the hacker community such as fear of criticism and fear 
of misleading the community (Ardichvili 2003), the anonymous nature of the community tends to reduce the 
extent of such risks. 
The interplay between risk and reward is reversed for Law Enforcement, however, as reflected in Figure 2.  As a 
hierarchical institution by nature, employees in the field of LE are frequently offered extrinsic rewards for 
knowledge-sharing including financial incentives, top-down mandates, and promotion. 
Research would suggest that the impacts of extrinsic rewards are two-fold: First, such rewards are useful in the 
early stages of a knowledge-sharing effort, but decrease in effectiveness over time (Kelman 1958; Blau 1967; 
Kohn 1993).  Second, extrinsic rewards can interplay with intrinsic risks in a similar fashion as seen in the 
hacker community, but with the opposite effect (Kohn 1993).  Extrinsic rewards can imply a winner or set of 
winners, leaving the rest of the community with a sense that they have failed or lost.  Within the context of the 
LE community, this can translate over time into increased intrinsic risk for the sharing of knowledge.  This 
sense of risk is amplified after repeated sharing efforts result in the absence of reward for the majority of the 
community.  This is coupled with a strong extrinsic risk for the use of shared knowledge in the LE community 
and the impact that such use can have on the outcomes of litigation if the knowledge turns out to be faulty. 
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Figure 2: Risk/reward interplay in the LE community 
 
The dynamics of these two communities create a context in which the risks over time for hackers are 
increasingly low while the rewards remain high.  On the other hand, the rewards for knowledge-sharing in the 
law enforcement community appear to diminish while the risks increase. 
Information Sensitivity:  In the LE community, different agencies categorize the sensitivity of certain 
information in different ways.  Within the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies, “classified 
information” is sensitive information, the access to which is limited to specific persons or groups of people by 
law.  Executive Order 12958 (Bush 1993) defines levels of classification and puts special processes in place to 
grant formal security clearances for access to classified data. There is very specific guidance on marking and 
handling, as well as penalties for improper disclosure.  The following three Classifications are defined in 32 
CFR Ch. XXIV (32 CFR, 2008). 
“Top Secret” is applied to information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause 
exceptionally grave damage to national security 
“Secret” is applied to information whose  unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious 
damage to national security 
“Confidential” is applied to information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause 
damage to national security 
Other countries and international organizations have similar schemes to classify extremely sensitive materials 
that require special handling.  All other information is considered unclassified, although, that does not mean it is 
not sensitive and would not cause harm to persons or society if improperly released.  Because of this, additional 
sensitivity levels are applied in law enforcement with different purposes: 
“For Official Use Only” (FOUO) is not used in a consistent manner in the government, but the Freedom of 
Information Act (Hamre, 2003) defines it as “unclassified information that may be exempt from mandatory 
release to the public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).”  FOIA specifically exempts law 
enforcement information which “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement 
investigations…”  The exemption exists whether an item is appropriately marked or not, however, many 
agencies regularly use this marking for clarity and control of the information.  FOUO information is also 
normally restricted by policy or practice to individuals within the agency that created it and those with whom it 
is shared. 
“Law Enforcement Sensitive” falls into the broad category of “Sensitive but Unclassified”, according to the 
Department of Homeland Security (MD 11042, 2004). Generally, these documents are categorized as being 
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FOUO, but have specific applicability to law enforcement and prosecution.  Most law enforcement investigative 
procedures and techniques, such as digital forensic processes, fall into this category.  Access outside of the 
agency that controls the data may require non-disclosure agreements and an affidavit that the information is 
required for law enforcement purposes.  Knowing that the receiving individual is appropriately vetted is 
particularly important to limit discovery by defendants. 
In contrast, the hacker community has no regulative levels of information sensitivity.  All information appears to 
be treated equally and there is no concern about information leakage (with the possible exception of a hacker’s 
true identity).   Also, there is no concern about penalties for improper disclosure as mandated in the LE 
community.  This absence of the burden of judging information sensitivity before disclosure then reduces the 
task load of disseminating information to the community.  Relative organizational structures have impacts well 
beyond categorization and dissemination of sensitive data, with influence across many different activities. 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Contemporary institutional theory holds that institutions “…consist of cognitive, normative and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior.” (Scott, 1995, p. 33).  The Hacker 
and LE communities are guided by very different organizational structures.  On the one hand, the hackers have 
no formalized regulations or explicit protocols to guide their knowledge-sharing behaviors.  Instead, they rely on 
a normative rule of engagement.  According to March and Olsen (1989), while normative rules can include 
codes, paradigms, cultures, and beliefs, much of the focus of organizations remains based on social beliefs.  In 
the hacker community, the operative social belief is that sharing information with others in the community is the 
norm. 
In contrast, the LE community relies more on regulative rules of engagement.  North (1990, p4) as quoted by 
Scott (1990, p36) suggests that regulative organizations “…consist of formal written rules as well as typically 
unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules. “  This regulative structure is the basis for 
the law enforcement community.  It guides their behavior regarding sensitivity of information, knowledge-
sharing, and the implications (i.e. stakes) of information sharing.  The normative behaviors or prevailing 
dynamic in law enforcement institutions is a series of laws and policies by which members are to abide.  These 
rules may run contrary to the sharing of knowledge.  For example, rules that govern the protection of sensitive 
information may run contrary to knowledge-sharing initiatives.  LE specialists may be reluctant to share 
information with individuals outside of their ego-centric groups for fear that it may be leaked to the general 
public. Specific efforts, therefore, must be made to create and encourage the use of specialized knowledge 
sharing networks that consider the special social constraints of LE. 
KNOWLEDGE-SHARING NETWORK 
Using the foundation of the regulative and normative pillars discussed by Scott (1995), the framework in Figure 
3 depicts the driving forces behind the information sharing behaviors of the hacker and LE groups.  The 
hackers’ information sharing behaviors seem to be driven primarily by normative forces, whereas the LE 
behaviors are impacted by a combination of the regulative and normative pillars.  These forces serve as a 
foundation for the factors that contribute to their information sharing behaviors.   
In the hacker community, the norm is to share knowledge with others.  Their culture and norms lead to factors 
that promote sharing.  A somewhat virtual presence allows for the benefits of both anonymity and recognition, 
and the reward structure is very much intrinsic.  Conversely, the LE community is founded on a culture of both 
regulation and norms.  However, its history of not disclosing information (and knowledge) and the potential of 
leakage or compromise leads to a high stakes environment.  Further, the LE community reward systems are 
primarily extrinsic in nature. 
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Stakes – High If Caught
Anonymity:  Social Norm
Ego-Centric:  Group and Individual
Recognition:  Individual
Sensitivity:  Information As Public Good
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Virtual Environment – Agile and Open
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 Figure 3:   Knowledge-sharing Framework:  Hacker vs. LE 
 
 
ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF THE INFORMATION SHARING GAP 
As shown in this framework of knowledge sharing, there appears to be fundamental differences in the bases 
from which hackers and LE operate, and these differences result in very different levels of effective knowledge 
sharing.  Anecdotally, one security expert specializing in the Australian retail banking market bemoans the huge 
disparity between knowledge sharing between hacker and LE, and succinctly states “Bottom line; they play 
more like a team than we do and it puts us way behind.  (Valentine, 2007)”  As anecdotal evidence, he points 
out that LE attends the Black Hat hacker conferences like RuxCon and DefCon in search of cutting-edge 
learning, but the hacker community shows no interest in LE conferences.   Valentine suggests that the hackers 
simply have little to learn from LE. 
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To be sure, LE has been the focus of legislative attempts to enhance knowledge sharing between various 
agencies since 9-11.  One example of this was the swift passage of the Federal-Local Information Sharing 
Partnership Act of 2001 (HB 1615).  Yet, as noted in the public administration sector, “…the presence of 
technology and the passage of legislation alone are not adequate to make this a reality…” (Zaworski, 2004).   
Similarly, in 2002 there were approximately 40 US government organizations collecting information but limited 
in sharing due to statutory and regulatory restrictions and the fact that “elements of the Intelligence Community 
(IC) verify information from each other (Luzwick, 2002).” 
The United States Office of National Intelligence has taken a step toward changing the normative behaviors of 
the LE community through the adoption of a new Information Sharing Strategy (McConnell and Meyerrose, 
2008).  Unlike earlier strategies focusing primarily on the mechanics of information sharing, the new strategy 
specifically offers drivers to transition information sharing from a “Need to Know” approach to a 
“Responsibility to Provide” and also moves the scope of information sharing from agency-centric to a more 
collaborative enterprise-centric approach.  This regulative approach, however, is placed in opposition to the very 
open, fast-flowing community of knowledge creation and sharing that exists in the hacker community. 
There is likely no direct way to number the sites, groups, and information channels available to the hacker 
community.  There are many entry-level sources such as Usenet newsgroups that cover a myriad of topics such 
as encryption, general hacking, viruses and copy-protection (Tomel, 2007).   Google offers up 6.8 million hits 
on “hacker forums”, and resources regarded by the hacker community as definitive in terms of both defining 
their culture and creating new hackers are openly available.  One such definitive work explicitly offers as core 
hacker beliefs that “The world is full of fascinating problems waiting to be solved” and “No problem should 
ever have to be solved twice (Raymond, 2001).”  This guide reiterates the notion that the hacking culture “runs 
on reputation” and is a gift culture, wherein “You gain status and reputation in it not by dominating other 
people, nor by being beautiful, nor by having things other people want, but rather by giving things away.” 
For hackers, the domain of information sharing is the Internet, apparently with little restriction.  Though there 
are skill-based distinctions within the hacker community and a loose hierarchy of information access based on 
those distinctions, hackers from the least skilled to the “elite” work to make their knowledge publicly available 
(Coyne and Leeson, 2006). 
 
SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although specifically organized with rigid reporting requirements, rich data sharing has simply not occurred 
within the law enforcement community to nearly the degree present among hackers. At the heart of this disparity 
are the different perceptions of rewards and risks for knowledge sharing within the respective communities. Law 
enforcement structures are intended to increase the likelihood of successful investigation and prosecution, but 
rigid structure is seen as an impediment to a sustainable knowledge sharing environment. The exact reversal of 
law enforcement’s risk and reward interplay found among hackers creates a great communication and sharing 
advantage to that group. 
Many hacker sites exist and are widely known and referenced within that community, law enforcement, and 
academia. There are many examples of recognition, anonymity, virtual life and other salient features that have 
been shown to affect communication in other contexts as well. A broad-based empirical study of their impact on 
knowledge sharing, however, has not been done and would lead to a better understanding of the impact of each 
factor.  
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Efforts continue for improving the degree of knowledge sharing within the LE community.  One such example 
is the National Repository for Digital Forensic Intelligence (NRDFI), an interactive platform for sharing best 
practices, tools, and tips amongst law enforcement professionals. Though in its early stages, enrollment is strong 
and interest appears high within the community.  As development continues for this emerging platform, two 
critical directions for future research appear to support the effectiveness of NRDFI: First, the factors laid out 
herein must be examined empirically in order to understand their impact on the risk/reward structure that drives 
continued knowledge sharing in the hacker community and stifles efforts in law enforcement.  Second, the 
knowledge gained through such empirical efforts must be translated into actionable design elements for 
continuing improvement of NRDFI in order to align the context of law enforcement knowledge sharing with the 
positive feedback exhibited in the hacker community’s risk/reward profile.  The goal of these efforts will be to 
propose new theoretical contributions through targeted studies, and then test these contributions by the 
implementation and analysis of appropriate design interventions within NRDFI itself.  Success holds the 
promise of improved LE knowledge sharing and equal footing in the race for cyber-control. 
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